We show several representation theorems for explanatory reasoning based on cumulative models. An explanatory process is given by a binary relation ⊲ between formulas in a propositional language where the intended meaning of α ⊲ γ is "γ is a preferred explanation of α". To each cumulative model E (a variation of those studied by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor) is associated an explanatory relation ⊲ E . We show results of the following type: An explanatory relation ⊲ satisfies certain logical postulates iff it coincides with ⊲ E for some cumulative model E of the appropriate type.
Introduction
Explanatory reasoning is the process of inferring an explanation of an observation. In a logic-based approach to explanatory reasoning a background theory is given by a consistent set of formulas Σ in a propositional language which describes the causal relations in the domain of application. A formula γ (consistent with Σ) is said to be an explanation of α, if Σ together with γ entails α.
The notion of explanation defined in the previous paragraph has at least two limitations. On the one hand, an explanation does not need to have, in general, a deductive connection with the observation. The link between them could reflect a more complex structure. For instance, an explanation could include the beliefs (expectations, expertise etc.) of the reasoning agent [6, 14, 23] . On the other hand, even if we restrict the attention to deductive explanations (as we are going to do in this article), it is clear that explanations have different degrees of plausibility. Thus a characteristic feature of explanatory reasoning (abduction) is the search for most plausible (simple, rational, preferred) explanations.
Despite the absent of a general definition of explanation, there have been several attempts to develop a logical account of explanatory reasoning [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 20, 22, 23] . Some of these attempts have followed the so called KLM methodology developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and many others for the study of consequence relations (see [16, 18, 19] and the references therein). We recall some features of this approach in the next paragraphs.
We use binary relations ⊲ between formulas called preferred explanatory relations where α ⊲ γ is to be read as "γ is a preferred explanation of α". For the sake of brevity we will refer to ⊲ as an explanatory relation instead of using the longer name of preferred explanatory relations. A first feature of the KLM methodology consists in isolating a set of rationality postulates for preferred explanatory relations. These postulates are regarded as the purely logical properties of the reasoning process [12] . We will use the system of postulates introduced in [20, 22] . Others systems for explanatory reasoning were studied by Flach [10, 11] , Bochman [4, 5] and Walliser et al. [23] . We make some comments about them later in this introduction.
For this article it is very important the heuristic used in [20, 22] to isolate the postulates. Given an explanatory relation ⊲ we associate to it the following consequence relation:
α |∼ ⊲ β, if γ (together with Σ) entails β for each γ such that α ⊲ γ.
The relation α |∼ ⊲ β is to be read as "when α is observed, then normally β is also present". The analysis of |∼ ⊲ through the KLM methodology gave the initial intuition for the postulates for explanatory reasoning [20] . The intuition was that the explanatory process encoded by a relation ⊲ is "rational" if its associated consequence relation |∼ ⊲ has good structural properties according to the KLM hierarchy. Most of the postulates proposed using this heuristic are similar to those introduced by Flach [10, 11] . The results presented in [20, 22] provides evidence of the (at least formal) correctness of the postulates in the sense that these postulates allow to develop a theory about explanatory reasoning similar to the KLM theory. The results in the present article provide more supporting evidence about this claim.
The KLM methodology has a second and very important component: the representation theorems. To explain what this is we need to recall the notion of a model. A cumulative model [16] is a structure M = (S, i, ≺) where S is set whose elements are called states, i is a function from S into a set of valuations of the language and ≺ is a binary relation over S. A state s ∈ S is said to satisfy a formula α, if every valuation in i(s) satisfies α. To each model it is associated a consequence relation |∼ M as follows:
α |∼ M β, if l(s) satisfies β for every s which is ≺-minimal among all states that satisfies α.
A representation theorem for a system S of postulates is a result saying that a consequence relation satisfies all postulates belonging to S if, and only if, it is of the form |∼ M for a model M of a certain type.
In this paper we adapt the notion of a cumulative model to the context of explanatory reasoning and use those models to show several representation theorems for explanatory relations. The idea is quite natural, a cumulative model is again a triple E = (S, l, ≺) but now l(s) is a set of formulas. We say that a state s ∈ S supports an observation α if Σ together with γ entails α for every γ in l(s). Then ⊲ E is defined as:
α ⊲ E γ, if γ belongs to l(s) for some s which is ≺-minimal among all states that support α.
We will show that the explanatory relations of the form ⊲ E can be characterized by the rationality postulates introduced in [20, 22] (together with others introduced in this paper). To state more precisely our results, let us call an explanatory relation ⊲ E-cumulative if |∼ ⊲ is cumulative in the KLM sense. The notion of an E-preferential explanatory relation is analogously defined. The main results are roughly the following. An explanatory relation ⊲ is E-cumulative iff ⊲ is of the form ⊲ E
One could think that these results are just straightforward corollaries of the corresponding representation theorems for consequence relations. That is to say, suppose ⊲ is preferential, then it would be natural to expect that a KLM preferential model for |∼ ⊲ could be easily transformed into a model for ⊲. But the situation is quite the opposite. There are pairs of completely different relations ⊲ and ⊲ * such that |∼ ⊲ and |∼ ⊲ * are the same (see example 3.7). On the other hand, we show that for a large collection of consequence relations we can use our representation theorems to easily find a KLM model for them.
The results from [20, 22] and the present work have made quite evident the especial role played by a single postulate called Right Strengthening (RS): if γ is a preferred explanation of α and γ ′ is a formula consistent with Σ such that γ ′ entails γ, then γ ′ is also a preferred explanation of α. This is a property with counterintuitive readings in the context of explanatory reasoning. For instance, if we want preferred explanations to be syntactically simple (i.e. with a minimal number of propositional atoms), then we will not expect RS to hold. RS sanctions preferred explanations which can include totally irrelevant facts (violating the principle of Ocam's raisor). In fact, if γ is a preferred explanation of α and γ ∧ a is consistent with Σ where a is just a literal, then under RS we would have that γ ∧ a is also a preferred explanation of α, but it could happen that a has nothing to do with α. Moreover there are many natural explanatory relations which do not satisfy RS (see [22] ). On the other hand, RS is relevant for explaining disjunctive observations (i.e. observations of the form α ∨ β) and is also related to situations where the preference criteria for selecting explanations is a transitive relation [22] .
One contribution of this paper is to show several representation theorems for relations not satisfying RS. For this end, we introduce two principles weaker than RS which are more easily satisfied but nevertheless suffice to show our representation theorems.
To end this introduction we will comment about previous works. This paper is a continuation of [20, 22] but it is essentially self-contained, nevertheless some familiarity with them will clearly provide the reader with a better overall picture of the subject. In [22] was analyzed the situation where the labeling function l is injective and l(s) contains only one formula for each s ∈ S. In this case, one can forget about the set S and work directly with a preference relation on the set of formulas. The distinction between injective and non-injective representations also occurs in the study of consequence relations. The seminal KLM paper [16] dealt with the general case and Freund [13] studied the injective case (see also [21, 24, 25] ).
Besides [3, 20, 22 ], Flach's work [10, 11] is the closest to ours. He studied several forms of inductive reasoning, in particular, he analyzed a system, denoted by EM, of postulates for explanatory induction. One of his main results states that EM is represented by the so called strong explanatory structures. In our terminology, these structures are cumulative models where ≺ is the empty relation. The reason for this extreme situation is the following. The system EM includes a rule named Converse entailment which is a variant of the following rule: if γ is a preferred explanation of α and α entails β, then γ is also a preferred explanation of β (we call it full explanatory cut). When an explanatory relation satisfies full explanatory cut, then the explanatory relation is represented by an injective cumulative model with ≺ the empty relation [22, proposition 5.14] . This explains why the semantic for EM found by Flach does not use a preference relation between states. A similar comment is valid for the work of Bochman [4, 5] who uses a rule called Weakening rule which corresponds to our full explanatory cut. In [20] two others (weaker) cut rules were introduced. Cut rules are tightly related to the selection mechanism behind preferred explanations and they can be regarded as the formal counterpart of selection criteria [22] .
In the concluding remarks of [10] was left as an open problem to find a "characterization of explanatory induction with respect to weaker (e.g. preferential) explanation mechanisms". An answer to this question follows from the results in [23] for the case when the preference mechanism is a total-preoder (i.e. the so called ranked models). Our results provide an alternative answer. Flach also studied the related but different notion of confirmatory induction and proved a representation theorem for it [10] .
Walliser et al. [23] presented a characterization of explanatory processes based on belief revision. They proposed a notion of explanation that differs substantially from ours since for them an explanation does not need to (logically) entail the observation and this will be one of our basic postulates. A similar notion was studied by Boutilier and Becher [6] . We will comment about this approach in section 2.3. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the basic notions, recall the postulates for consequence and explanatory relations and show some facts about the postulates we need in the sequel. In section 3 we recall the underlying heuristic used for isolating the postulates for explanatory relations and show how this heuristic leads to a duality between explanatory relations and consequence relations. In section 4 we introduce the cumulative models. In section 5 we show the soundness of these models and in section 6 we complete the proofs of the representation theorems. In section 7 we show how to get some representation theorems for consequence relations from the results presented in this paper. Finally in section 8 we make some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the terminology and some definitions about consequence and explanatory relations as presented by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [16] and Pino-Pérez and Uzcátegui [20, 22] . We also establish some basic facts about explanatory relations which will be needed in the sequel.
We will work with a classical propositional language. The classical consequence relation is denoted by ⊢. If Γ is a set of formulas, then Cn(Γ) denotes the set of all classical consequences of Γ. As usual ⊤ and ⊥ denote respectively the formulas true and false. A model of a set of formulas Γ is a valuation M of the language that gives the value 1 to each formula in Γ. We write M |= α if M is a model of {α}. A collection of formulas is consistent if it has a model.
The background theory describing the causal relations of the domain of application is a consistent set of formulas Σ. The collection of formulas consistent with Σ is denoted by F orm Σ . We write α ⊢ Σ β when Σ ∪ {α} ⊢ β. The set of valuations satisfying Σ ∪ {α} is denoted by mod(α).
Nonmonotonic consequence relations
A consequence relation is a binary relation |∼ between formulas on a classical propositional language. If α and β are formulas, then the pair α |∼ β is read: "if α holds, then normally β holds", or "β is a plausible consequence of α".
The basic rationality postulates for consequence relations as presented in [16] are the following. We use the following notation
If there is no ambiguity we will write C(α) instead of C |∼ (α). Since Σ describes the causal relations of the domain of application, the following definition taken from [20] is very natural when dealing with explanatory reasoning. 
If there is no danger of confusion we will just say adequate instead of adequate with respect to Σ.
Explanatory relations
Given α ∈ F orm Σ , the collection of explanations of α with respect to Σ is denoted by Expla(α) and is defined as follows:
Expla(α) contains all possible explanations of α and from this set the preferred explanations will be selected. In particular, we have ruled out trivial formulas by requiring that an explanation has to be a formula consistent with Σ. An explanatory relation is defined as a subset of {(α, γ) : γ ∈ Expla(α)}.
Definition 2.3. An explanatory relation for Σ will be any binary relation ⊲ over F orm Σ such that
We read α ⊲ γ as "γ is a preferred explanation of α (with respect to Σ)".
Condition (1) says that we are using deduction as the basic explanatory mechanisms. Thus we could have given to our relations a more informative name as deductive explanatory relations. We will come back to this issue later in section 2.3.
Example 2.4. We introduce for later reference an extreme example: reverse deduction.
Thus, by definition, every explanatory relation ⊲ satisfies
Now we recall some of the structural properties of explanatory relations as presented in [20] . In section 3 we will recall the heuristic used to isolate this postulates.
The names of the postulates are, respectively, Explanatory cautious monotony, Explanatory strong cautious monotony, Explanatory cautious cut, Left Logical Equivalence and Explanatory consistency preservation. Notice that E-S-CM implies E-CM 1 .
Other postulates used in this paper are the following:
RS stands for Right strengthening, RLE Σ is Right logical equivalence, LOR − is an elimination rule for disjunctions on the left, ROR is an introduction rule for disjunctions on the right and SC stands for Strengthened Cumulativity. Now we recall a classification scheme for explanatory relations introduced in [20, 22] and which is analogous to that given in 2.1. A justification for the names in this hierarchy will be given in section 3.
Definition 2.5. An explanatory relation is called E-cumulative when it satisfies E-CM, E-C-Cut, LLE Σ and E-Con Σ . It is called E-S-cumulative when it satisfies E-S-CM, E-C-Cut, LLE Σ and E-Con Σ and E-preferential when it is E-S-cumulative and satisfies LOR − . 2 Postulates SC is a technical condition which is needed for the proof of a representation theorem. The following proposition shows the connection of SC with the other postulates. Its easy proof is left to the reader. Proposition 2.6. Let ⊲ be an explanatory relation satisfying LLE Σ and E-Con Σ . The following are equivalent.
(i) ⊲ satisfies E-S-CM and E-C-Cut.
(ii) For every α, β ∈ F orm Σ , if β ⊲ δ, δ ⊢ Σ α and α ⊲δ, then there is ρ such that α ⊲ ρ and ρ ⊢ Σ β.
In particular, if ⊲ satisfies LLE Σ , E-Con Σ and SC, then ⊲ is E-S-cumulative.
As we have explained in the introduction, RS is a controversial postulate. However, two of its consequences, which are much easily satisfied, suffice for the proof of the representation theorems.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose ⊲ is E-S-cumulative and satisfies RS, then SC and LOR − hold.
Proof. We will show first that SC holds. Suppose that β ⊲ δ, δ ⊢ Σ α and α ⊲δ. Then α ∨ β ⊲δ, otherwise by E-S-CM we have (α ∨ β) ∧ α ⊲ δ and by LLE Σ we get that α ⊲ δ which is not possible. On the other hand, from E-S-CM we have (α ∨ β) ∧ β ⊲ δ. Therefore by E-C-Cut there is γ such that (α ∨ β) ⊲ γ and γ ⊢ Σ β. Thus γ ∧ ¬β is consistent with Σ. Put ρ = γ ∧ ¬β. By RS, α ∨ β ⊲ ρ. Since ρ ⊢ Σ α and ρ ⊢ Σ ρ ∨ β, then by E-S-CM and LLE Σ we conclude that α ⊲ ρ and ρ ∨ β ⊲ ρ. Now we will show that LOR − holds. Let α, β and γ in F orm Σ be such that α ∨ β ⊲ γ. If γ ⊢ Σ α or γ ⊢ Σ β, then by E-S-CM and LLE Σ it is clear that α ⊲ γ or β ⊲ γ and there is nothing to show. Thus we assume that γ ∧ α and γ ∧ β are consistent with Σ. By RS we have α ∨ β ⊲ α ∧ γ and
We present now some examples of explanatory relations and refer the reader to [22] where many more examples are studied with details. In particular, all the examples we present below are E-S-cumulative (see [22] ).
The example that follows is particularly interesting since it is an explanatory relation that satisfies LOR − and SC but, in a very strong sense, is syntax dependent on the right hand side, thus it does not satisfy RS. Moreover, it uses a very natural simplicity criteria for selecting the preferred explanations [17] .
Example 2.8. For this example we assume Σ to be empty. A literal is an atom or a negation of an atom. Let C be the set of all formulas that are conjunctions of literals (without repetitions) together with ⊤ and ⊥. Define a partial order ≺ lit on C as follows:
In other word, α ⊲ lit γ if γ is a prime implicant of α.
We will show that ⊲ lit satisfies SC. In fact, suppose β ⊲ lit γ, γ ⊢ α and α ⊲ lit γ. By the definition of ≺ lit there is δ ∈ C such that γ ⊢ δ and α ⊲ lit δ. It suffices to show that (δ ∨ β) ⊲ lit δ. Suppose not, then there is ρ ∈ C such that δ ⊢ ρ and (δ ∨ β) ⊲ lit ρ and ρ ⊢ δ. There are η, ξ ∈ C and a literal l such that δ = ρ ∧ l ∧ η and γ = ρ ∧ l ∧ η ∧ ξ. As ρ ∧ ¬l ⊢ ¬δ and ρ ⊢ δ ∨ β, then ρ ∧ ¬l ⊢ β. Since γ ⊢ β, then ρ ∧ η ∧ ξ ⊢ β and this contradicts that β ⊲ lit γ.
This relation also satisfies LOR − , this can be proved directly as we did for SC but we postpone its proof for later (see remark 3.8).
Example 2.9. For this example, we suppose that the language is finite. Let mod(Σ) be the set of all models of Σ and consider ⊏ a strict partial order over mod(Σ). Recall that mod(α) denotes the set of models of Σ ∪ {α}. Define the notion of a minimal model of a formula α as follows
Relations of the form ⊲ c are the typical relations satisfying RS, ROR and LOR − .
There are some variants of ⊲ c which are interesting. A subset A of mod(Σ) is called an ⊏-antichain (or just an antichain) if the models in A are mutually ⊏-incomparable. For example, min(α) is a antichain for every formula α. In fact, min(α) is a maximal antichain of mod(α), i.e. if min(α) ⊆ A ⊆ mod(α) and A is an antichain, then A = min(α). We define a new relation as follows:
It is not difficult to show that ⊲ ma satisfies SC and LOR − but in general does not satisfy RS.
is an antichain of mod(α) of maximal cardinality.
In most cases ⊲ mac does not satisfy neither LOR − nor SC. However, there is a choice of ⊏ such that ⊲ mac satisfies LOR − but not SC and also there is ⊏ such that ⊲ mac satisfies SC but not LOR − . For example, let Σ be a theory with four models M , N , S and T and let ⊏ be the following order:
Then ⊲ mac satisfies LOR − but not SC. On the other hand, if ⊏ is the following order,
In particular, this shows that under the postulates of E-Scumulativity LOR − and SC are independent postulates.
An alternative approach
Before we continue with the main objective of this paper, we would like to comment about some alternative methods to define a notion of an explanation. We hope that these comments will help the reader to place our work in a more general context. Most presentations of abduction assume that an observation must be inferred, in some way, from any of its abduced explanations. In this paper we are using classical deduction as the inference mechanism, so our explanatory relations, by definition, have the property that when α ⊲ γ, then γ ⊢ Σ α. We will make some brief comments about the alternative approach of replacing ⊢ Σ by a more general consequence relation.
For the rest of this section, |∼ is a fixed consequence relation which we assume to be reflexive and Σ-supraclassical (i.e. if α ⊢ Σ β, then α |∼ β). There are three notions of explanation naturally associated to it ( [20, 23] ). In the following γ is assumed to be consistent with Σ.
Recall that ⊲ rd denotes the reverse classical deduction (see example 2.4). The following obvious fact shows the interdependence between these four notions:
We use the symbol | < instead of ⊲ because | < se and | < e are not explanatory relations in our sense 3 . Instead of (1) they satisfy the following:
This property affirms that explanatory reasoning is subsumed by reversed nonmonotonic reasoning.
The notions of epistemic and strong epistemic explanation have aplications specially in contexts where an explanation does not necessarily entail the observation [6] . When |∼ is a rational consequence relation, | < e and | < se are very interesting due to the well known connection between the AGM theory of belief revision and non monotonic logic [15] . The interpretation of these relations in terms of belief revision makes them very appealing. In [23] is given a complete characterization of | < se when |∼ is a rational consequence relation but the more general question of finding postulates to characterize | < se when |∼ is just preferential was left open. In [10] , | < se was called the explanatory consequence relation associate to |∼. Both papers [10, 23] propose | < se as a good definition of abduction. In [20] , relations of the form ⊲ |∼ were called causal and were completely characterized in terms of postulates.
It is important to realize that the relations ⊲ |∼ , | < e and | < se are three different ways of interpreting abduction as non monotonic reasoning in the reverse. We are not arguing in favor of any specific form of explanatory reasoning. Instead, we are interested in the issue of representing relations by some natural mathematical structure. More specifically, in this article we will focus on the representation of relations contained in ⊲ rd but quite different from ⊲ |∼ .
The underlying heuristic
In this section we present the heuristic behind the postulates which was originally developed in [20] .
The abductive consequence relation |∼ ⊲
Recall that to each explanatory relation ⊲ we have associated a consequence relation |∼ ⊲ as follows:
We read α |∼ ⊲ β as "when α is observed, then β is normally also present". This abductive consequence relation was introduced in [20] . It allows to switch from the explanations of an observation to its abductive consequences and thus it provides a bridge between explanatory reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning. This type of relations are named Scott consequence relations in [4, 5] .
On the other hand, to each consequence relation |∼ we associate an explanatory relation as follows: let γ be a formula consistent with Σ.
The initial intuition for the postulates for explanatory relation listed in section 2.2 came from an analysis of |∼ ⊲ and ⊲ |∼ . Some of the postulates can be rewritten in terms of |∼ ⊲ as follows:
From this it is easy to check that |∼ satisfies Cut if, and only if, ⊲ |∼ satisfies E-CM. The propositions that follow illustrate very well the interplay between ⊲, |∼ ⊲ and ⊲ |∼ . They will be needed in the sequel. The proof of the first one is straightforward and is left to the reader. Proposition 3.1. Let ⊲ be an E-cumulative explanatory relation and α, β formulas. The following are equivalent:
(i) α |∼ ⊲ β and β |∼ ⊲ α.
(ii) For all γ, α ⊲ γ iff β ⊲ γ.
Since (ii) If the language is finite and |∼ ⊲ satisfies OR, then ⊲ satisfies LOR − .
Proof. (i)
(ii) Suppose the language is finite and |∼ ⊲ satisfies OR. Let α, β ∈ F orm Σ .
From this it is obvious that LOR − holds.
The following theorem justifies our choice of terminology and is a first indication of a duality between explanatory and consequence relations. (ii) If ⊲ is E-preferential, then |∼ ⊲ is preferential and adequate w.r.t. Σ.
(iii) If |∼ is cumulative, then ⊲ |∼ is E-cumulative and satisfies RS.
(iv) If |∼ is preferential, then ⊲ |∼ is E-preferential and satisfies RS.
Proof. Parts (i) and (iii) were proved in [20] . Part (ii) follows from part (i) and proposition 3.3. To see part (iv), we recall that when |∼ is preferential, then |∼ ⊲ satisfies E-S-CM (see [20] ). From this, part (iii) and lemma 2.7 the result follows.
We end this section by showing a lemma that will be needed in the sequel. It follows from the results in [16] , we present its proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 3.5. Let ⊲ be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation that satisfies LOR − . Suppose α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ α and β ∨ η |∼ ⊲ β, then α ∨ β ∨ η |∼ ⊲ α and α ∨ η |∼ ⊲ α.
Proof
Hence, again by proposition 3.1, we easily conclude that α ∨ η |∼ ⊲ α.
A duality between ⊲ |∼ and |∼ ⊲
To better understand the duality between explanatory and consequence relations we consider the following maps:
The following result (taken from [8, 20] ) summarizes the main properties of these mappings.
Proposition 3.6. Let |∼ be a consequence relation and ⊲ an explanatory relation. Then
|∼ ⊆ Ψ(Φ( |∼ )).

⊲ ⊆ Φ(Ψ( ⊲ )).
3. Ψ( ⊲ ) is adequate.
Φ(Ψ(Φ( |∼ ))) = Φ( |∼ ).
Ψ(Φ(Ψ( ⊲ ))) = Ψ( ⊲ ).
It is easy to verify that (Ψ • Φ)( |∼ ) = |∼ for every adequate consequence relation. On the other hand, an explanatory relation ⊲ is called causal if (Φ • Ψ)( ⊲ ) = ⊲ [20] . This is a very special class of explanatory relations. A causal explanatory relation ⊲ is completely determined by |∼ ⊲ . Part 4 of the above proposition says that ⊲ |∼ is causal for every consequence relation |∼. The relations of the form ⊲ c given in 2.9 are the typical examples of causal relations. For finite language, a relation is causal iff it satisfies RS and ROR [20] .
This duality between explanatory relations and consequence relations would be very sharp if Φ and Ψ were the inverse of each other. However, this is not the case as Ψ is not injective. We give below two quite disparate explanatory relations ⊲ and ⊲ * such that Ψ( ⊲ ) = Ψ( ⊲ * ).
In spite of these limiting aspects, |∼ ⊲ brings very useful information for the study of ⊲.
Example 3.7. (Three explanatory relations which have associated the same abductive consequence relation) For this example Σ is empty and the language is finite. Fix a partial order ⊏ on the valuations of the language and consider the relations ⊲ lit , ⊲ ma , and ⊲ rd (see examples 2.4, 2.8 and 2.9). We claim that
For notational simplicity, let |∼ lit be Ψ(⊲ lit ), |∼ ma be Ψ(⊲ ma ) and |∼ rd be Ψ(⊲ rd ). First of all, notice that to show that Ψ(⊲) = ⊢ it suffices that Ψ(⊲) ⊆ ⊢.
For ⊲ rd , let us notice that α ⊲ rd α for all consistent α. Thus if α |∼ rd β, then necessarily α ⊢ β. For ⊲ lit , let α |∼ lit β and we will show that α ⊢ β. This follows immediately from the fact that every formula is equivalent to the disjunction of all its prime implicant. We provide a proof for the sake of completeness. Let 
Finally, for ⊲ ma , suppose α |∼ ma β. Let M |= α. Then there is a maximal ⊏-antichain A ⊆ mod(α) containing M . Let γ be a formula whose models are the valuation in A. Then by the definition of ⊲ ma we have α ⊲ ma γ and thus γ ⊢ β. Therefore M |= β.
Remark 3.8. It follows from proposition 3.3 that ⊲ lit , ⊲ ma , and ⊲ rd satisfies LOR − .
Models for explanatory relations
In this section we introduce the notion of cumulative models for explanatory reasoning. It is a variant of the original definition given in [16] which fits naturally in the context of explanatory reasoning. Definition 4.1. A preference relation ≺ over a set S will be a irreflexive binary relation over S. Given A ⊆ S, we say that b is ≺-minimal (or just minimal) in A if b ∈ A and there is no a ∈ A with a ≺ b. The set of minimal elements of A is denoted by min(A, ≺) (or just min(A) when there is no danger of confusion).
Definition 4.2.
A model is a triple E = S, l, ≺ where S is a set, l is a function from S into the collection of non empty subsets of F orm Σ and ≺ is a preference relation over S. For each formula α, let α = {s ∈ S : γ ⊢ Σ α for all γ ∈ l(s)}.
To each model E = S, l, ≺ is associated an explanatory relation and a consequence relation as follows
When l(s) contains only one element, E is called a single valued model and, in this case, we assume that l(s) ∈ F orm Σ . When the relation ≺ is transitive we say that the model E is transitive.
Before we continue, we would like to make some comments about a difference between our models and the original definition given in [16] . In that paper, a model M is a triple (S, i, ≺) where S is a set of possible states ("they represent possible states of affairs, including perhaps the state of mind or knowledge of the reasoner" [16] ), each state s is labeled with a set i(s) of valuations ("the set of worlds the reasoner thinks are possible at this state" [16] ) and ≺ is a preference relation over S. In this context, α denotes the set of all states s such that every valuation in i(s) satisfies α. An inference relation associated to the model M is defined by
Notice that |∼ M =|∼ E if we take i(s) to be mod(l(s)).
Since the valuations in i(s) for s ∈ min( α, ≺) are regarded as the most likely "worlds" where α holds, then the relation α |∼ M β is read as "α normally implies β". Under this interpretation it is then natural to consider that a formula γ is a preferred explanation of α if every valuation satisfying γ is a minimal world for α, that is to say, if the following holds:
A drawback of this notion of a preferred explanation is that, regardless of the model used, it satisfies the postulate RS. And as we said in the introduction, RS is a controversial postulate and there are many natural examples of explanatory relations not satisfying it (see [22] ). Moreover, if the language is infinite it is not obvious when there would be a γ satisfying (4) . In addition to that, we cannot expect to associate an explanatory relation to a model in a way that depends only on the valuations in i(s). This is because the explanatory relation would satisfy RLE Σ regardless of the model used and this will rule out explanatory relations that are syntax dependent on the right (notice that RLE Σ follows from RS). All these considerations say that the definition given in (2) is more general than (4). Now we go back to our discussion about the explanatory relation associated to a model. The definition of ⊲ E will make sense if there are plenty of minimal elements. The next definition deals with this issue.
Definition 4.3.
[16] Let ≺ be a preference relation over S. We say that a subset A of S is smooth (with respect to ≺) if for every a ∈ A either a is minimal in A or there is b ∈ A with b ≺ a and b minimal in A.
For instance, if S is finite and ≺ is a partial order, then every subset of S is smooth. Notice that in a model E = S, l, ≺ the notion of a smooth set does not depend on the labeling function l.
We introduce now a new definition which depends on l and which turns out to be the right notion for representing E-cumulative relations.
Definition 4.4. Given a model E = S, l, ≺ , we say that A ⊆ S is l-smooth is the following holds: For every s ∈ A there is t ∈ min(A) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s.
Let
lmin( α) = {s ∈ S : ∃t ∈ min( α) l(s) = l(t)}.
Notice that α is l-smooth, if for all s ∈ α, then s ∈ lmin( α) or there is t ∈ min( α) with t ≺ s. Also notice that s ∈ lmin( α) iff α ⊲ E l(s). Now we introduce the models used for giving a semantic to explanatory relations.
Definition 4.5.
A model E = S, l, ≺ is a cumulative model if α is smooth and non empty for every α ∈ F orm Σ . We say that E is a cumulative l-model if α is non empty and l-smooth for every α ∈ F orm Σ Notice that every cumulative model is clearly a l-model but not viceversa as we show in the following. Let N , M , P and Q be different valuations in a finite language. Let Σ be the theory whose models are N , M , P and Q. Pick formulas γ M , γ N , γ P and γ Q with a unique model, namely, M , N , P and Q respectively. We define a model as follows. The set S contains six states s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 and s 6 . The labeling function l is given by l(
To check that this model is a cumulative l-model, consider α ∈ F orm Σ . Since for all V ∈ mod(Σ) there exists s ∈ S such that l(s) = γ V , then α is non empty. Now we will prove that α is lsmooth. Suppose that there is s ∈ α such that s ∈ min( α). Then s ∈ {s 2 , s 4 , s 6 }. If s = s 2 , then s 1 ∈ min( α) and s 1 ≺ s. If s = s 6 , then s 5 ∈ min( α) and s 5 ≺ s. Finally, if s = s 4 , we consider two cases: (i) Q |= α. Then s 6 ∈ min( α) and l(s 6 ) = l(s 4 ).
(ii) Q |= α. Then s 3 ∈ min( α) and s 3 ≺ s. However, it is not a cumulative model since α is not smooth for α = γ M ∨ γ N ∨ γ P . In fact, s 4 ∈ α, but there is no t ∈ min( α, ≺) such that t ≺ s 4 . Notice that this does not contradict the l-smoothness of α as s 6 ∈ min( α, ≺) and l(s 4 ) = l(s 6 ).
In the following, for notational convenience, we will write α instead of α. Let ⊲ be the explanatory relation associated to this model. We claim that ⊲ cannot be represented by a single valued cumulative model. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a cumulative single valued
Now we introduce three properties of a model. They are the counterpart of LOR − , SC and RS. Definition 4.7. A single valued model E = S, l, ≺ is said to have property O if given α, β ∈ F orm Σ and s ∈ min( α ∨ β), there are states t i ∈ min( α) (i = 1, · · · , n) and r j ∈ min( β)
Definition 4.8. A single valued model E = S, l, ≺ is said to have property S if given α, β ∈ F orm Σ and s ∈ min( β)∩ α, then s ∈ lmin( α) or there are states s ′ and t such that
Definition 4.9. A single valued cumulative model E = S, l, ≺ is said to have property P if for all s ∈ S and γ ∈ Expla(l(s)) there exists s ′ such that γ = l(s ′ ) and t ≺ s for every t with t ≺ s ′ .
Soundness of the models
In this section we show that our models are sound.
Proof. To simplify the notation let us denote ⊲ by ⊲ E . Let α ∈ F orm Σ . By hypothesis α = ∅ and since α is l-smooth, there is t ∈ min( α). Thus E-Con Σ is satisfied. To see that E-C-Cut holds, suppose α ∧ β ⊲ γ and α |∼ ⊲ β. Let s ∈ min( α ∧ β) be such that γ ∈ l(s). Since s ∈ α, then there is t ∈ min( α) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. As α |∼ ⊲ β we have t ∈ α ∧ β. Hence t ≺ s, as s ∈ min( α ∧ β). Thus l(s) = l(t) and α ⊲ γ.
Finally, we verify that E-CM holds. Suppose α ⊲ γ and α |∼ ⊲ β. Let s ∈ min( α) be such that γ ∈ l(s). Since α |∼ ⊲ β we have s ∈ α ∧ β. By the l-smoothness of α ∧ β there is t ∈ min( α ∧ β) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. But t ≺ s as s ∈ min( α). Therefore l(s) = l(t) and α ∧ β ⊲ γ.
Proof. By theorem 5.1 we only need to verify that E-S-CM holds. Suppose α ⊲ E γ and γ ⊢ Σ β. Let s ∈ min( α) be such that l(s) = γ. Thus s ∈ α ∧ β. By the l-smoothness of α ∧ β there is t ∈ min( α ∧ β) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. In particular, t ∈ α, thus t ≺ s and hence
The following proposition show the soundness of some properties introduced in the previous section.
Proposition 5.3 . Let E = S, l, ≺ be a single valued model.
(ii) If E = S, l, ≺ has property S, then ⊲ E satisfies SC.
(iii) If E = S, l, ≺ has property P, then ⊲ E satisfies RS.
Proof. (i) It is immediate from the definition of ⊲ E and the property O. Consider α ∨ β ⊲ E γ with α, β and γ in F orm Σ . There exists s ∈ min( α ∨ β) such that l(s) = γ. By the property O there are states t i ∈ min( α) (i = 1, · · · , n) and r j ∈ min( β) (j = 1, · · · , m) such that
(ii) Suppose β ⊲ E δ, δ ⊢ Σ α and α ⊲ E δ. Then there is s ∈ S such that s ∈ min( β) ∩ α with l(s) = δ. Clearly s ∈ lmin( α), thus by property S, there are
(iii) Suppose α ⊲ E γ and γ ′ ∈ Expla(γ). There is s ∈ min( α) such that l(s) = γ. From the property P, there exists s ′ such that l(s ′ ) = γ ′ and for all t if t ≺ s ′ then t ≺ s. It follows that s ′ ∈ min( α) and α ⊲ E γ ′ .
Representation theorems
The results of the previous section say that cumulative models are sound in the sense that the explanatory relation associated to each one of them is E-cumulative (or E-S-cumulative if the model is single valued). In this section we show the completeness of these models. An explanatory relation ⊲ is said to be representable if there is a model E such that ⊲ = ⊲ E .
Cumulative relations
We start with a representation theorem for cumulative explanatory relations.
Theorem 6.1. An explanatory relation ⊲ is E-cumulative iff ⊲ is represented by a cumulative model.
Proof. The if part was already shown in proposition 5.1. For the other direction, we fix an E-cumulative explanatory relation ⊲. We will define a cumulative model that represents it.
For each α ∈ F orm Σ , let Ep(α) = {γ : α ⊲ γ}, i.e., Ep(α) is the set of all the preferred explanations of α (with respect to ⊲). Let S be {Ep(α) : α ∈ F orm Σ } and l be the identity function. Finally ≺ is defined as follows:
Let E = S, l, ≺ .
(i) The relation ≺ defined by (5) is irreflexive and antisymmetric. In fact, from the definition of ≺ it is clear that it is irreflexive. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that it is not antisymmetric. Then there are s, t ∈ S such that s ≺ t and t ≺ s. From (5), there are α, β, α ′ and
(ii) Ep(α) is the minimum of α for all α in F orm Σ . In particular, α is smooth and not empty for all α ∈ F orm Σ . Therefore E is a cumulative model.
To see this, let α ∈ F orm Σ and put t = Ep(α). Since ≺ is irreflexive, then t ≺ t. On the other hand, let s ∈ α with s = t and β be such that s = Ep(β). Since s ∈ α, then β |∼ ⊲ α. By proposition 3.1, α |∼ ⊲ β. Thus t ≺ s and, by (i), s ≺ t. Therefore t is the minimum of α.
(iii) We will finally show that ⊲ = ⊲ E . If α ⊲ γ, then γ ∈ Ep(α) and by (ii) we have Ep(α) is the minimum ofα and therefore α ⊲ E γ. On the other hand, suppose α ⊲ E γ. Then there exists s ∈ min(α, ≺) such that γ ∈ l(s). From (ii), we necessarily have s = Ep(α) and thus γ ∈ Ep(α). Therefore α ⊲ γ.
Now we deal with the E-S-cumulative explanatory relations.
Theorem 6.2. An explanatory relation ⊲ is E-S-cumulative iff it is represented by a cumulative single valued l-model.
Proof.
One direction was shown in proposition 5.2. For the other direction, suppose ⊲ is E-Scumulative. Let S be the collection of all pairs (α, γ) such that α ⊲ γ. Let l(α, γ) = γ and ≺ be defined on S by
We claim that E = S, l, ≺ is a cumulative l-model that represents ⊲. First of all, since ⊲ satisfies E-Con Σ , then α is not empty for all α ∈ F orm Σ .
(i) It is straightforward that if α ⊲ γ, then (α, γ) ∈ min( α, ≺).
(ii) To see that α is l-smooth for all α ∈ F orm Σ , let (β, γ) ∈ α. If α ⊲ γ, then by (i) (α, γ) ∈ min( α, ≺) and l(α, γ) = l(β, γ). Suppose α ⊲γ. Since β ⊲ γ, then by E-S-CM α ∧ β ⊲ γ.
Hence by E-C-Cut there is ρ such that α ⊲ ρ and ρ ⊢ Σ β. Therefore (α, ρ) ≺ (β, γ) and (α, ρ) ∈ min( α, ≺) by part (i).
(iii) Now we show that if (β, γ) ∈ min( α, ≺), then α ⊲ γ. Towards a contradiction, suppose α ⊲γ.
Since β ⊲ γ, as before by E-S-CM we have α ∧ β ⊲ γ. By E-C-Cut, there is ρ such that α ⊲ ρ and ρ ⊢ Σ β. Therefore (α, ρ) ∈ α and (α, ρ) ≺ (β, γ), which is a contradiction.
From (i), (ii) and (iii) we conclude that E is a cumulative l-model and ⊲ = ⊲ E .
Preferential relations
In this section we present a representation theorem for preferential explanatory relations, that is to say, in addition to the postulates for E-S-cumulativity we also include LOR − . The main result is the following theorem. We now define a model which will be used in this and the next section. Let S be the collection of all pairs (α, γ) such that α ⊲ γ. Let l(α, γ) = γ and ≺ be defined on S by
Let E = (S, l, ≺) be the model defined above. The proof of theorem 6.3 will follow after we prove several lemmas.
Lemma 6.4. The relation ≺ defined by (6) is antisymmetric.
Proof. Suppose there are (α, γ) and (β, δ) in S such that (α, γ) ≺ (β, δ) and (β, δ) ≺ (α, γ). Then α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ α and α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ β. By proposition 3.2, we conclude β ⊲ γ but this is not possible, as γ ⊢ Σ β.
Lemma 6.5. Let ⊲ be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation satisfying SC. Then ⊲ = ⊲ E where E is the model defined above by (6) . Moreover this model has property S and if ⊲ satisfies LOR − , then E has property O.
Relations that satisfy RS
We have seen that E-S-cumulative relations satisfying SC and LOR − are represented by transitive cumulative models but this result was proved only for a finite language. In this section we show that under RS this can be extended to an arbitrary language. We recall that SC and LOR − follows from RS for E-S-cumulative relations (see proposition 2.7).
Theorem 6.8. Let ⊲ be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation. Then ⊲ satisfies RS iff ⊲ is represented by a single valued cumulative transitive model with property P.
Proof. The if part was proved in proposition 5.3. Conversely, suppose ⊲ is E-S-cumulative and satisfies RS. Let E be the model defined at the beginning of section 6.2. By lema 2.7 we know that ⊲ satisfies LOR − and SC. Thus by lemmas 6.4, 6.5 and 6.7, it remains to be shown that E is a cumulative model and has property P. First we claim if α ∈ F orm Σ and (β, δ) ∈ α, then the following holds:
In fact, to see (⇒) of (7), suppose
For the direction (⇐) of (7), assume (β, δ) ∈ α and α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ β. Suppose, towards a contradiction, (β, δ) ∈ min( α). Then there exists (η, θ) ∈ α such that (η, θ) ≺ (β, δ). Then η ∨ β |∼ ⊲ η and θ ⊢ Σ β. By proposition 3.2 and lemma 3.5, we have α ∨ β ∨ η ⊲ θ. Notice that θ ⊢ Σ α ∨ β, then α ∨ β ⊲ θ by E-S-CM and LLE Σ . Finally, as α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ β, then θ ⊢ Σ β but this is impossible because (η, θ) ≺ (β, δ).
We show now that E is cumulative. Let α ∈ F orm Σ . Since ⊲ satisfies E-Con Σ , then α is not empty. Let (β, δ) ∈ α. If (β, δ) ∈ min( α), then by (7) we have α ∨ β |∼ ⊲ β. Then there is δ such that α ∨ β ⊲ δ and δ ⊢ Σ β. Let γ = δ ∧ α ∧ ¬β, from RS we have (α ∨ β) ⊲ γ. Moreover, γ ⊢ Σ α and γ ⊢ Σ β. Thus (α ∨ β, γ) ≺ (β, δ) and from (7) it follows that (α ∨ β, γ) ∈ min( α).
We finally show that E satisfies P. Let s = (α, δ) ∈ S and γ ∈ Expla(l(s)). By RS we have that
Injective representation
We end this section by putting some of the results from [22] in the present context of cumulative models. To each preference relation ≺ over F orm Σ is associated an explanatory relation ⊲ ≺ as follows:
We say that ≺ is smooth, if Expla(α) is smooth with respect to ≺ (as defined in 4.3) for every α ∈ F orm Σ . The problem of characterizing the explanatory relations of the form ⊲ ≺ was the main issue studied in [22] . For that end, a preference relation ≺ e over F orm Σ was associated to each explanatory relation ⊲ as follows. Let γ be an admissible formula (i.e. α ⊲ γ for some α ∈ F orm Σ ) and δ ∈ F orm Σ , then
Our next result says that the problem studied in [22] corresponds to the problem of characterizing explanatory relations with an injective representation. Theorem 6.9. Let ⊲ be an explanatory relation. Then ⊲ is represented by a single valued cumulative model E = S, l, ≺ with l injective iff ≺ e is smooth and ⊲ = ⊲ ≺e .
Proof. Suppose that ≺ e is smooth and ⊲ = ⊲ ≺e . Let S = F orm Σ and l(γ) = γ, then E = S, l, ≺ is a single valued injective model. It is routine to verify that ⊲ = ⊲ E . Now suppose ⊲ is represented by a single valued cumulative model E = S, l, ≺ with l injective. Define a preference relation ≺ * over F orm Σ as follows: δ ≺ * γ if either δ = l(s), γ = l(t) and s ≺ t or δ is in the range of l and γ is not. It is routine to verify that ≺ * is a smooth preference relation and ⊲ = ⊲ ≺ * . Now the result follows from [22, proposition 5.8] .
Example 6.10. An explanatory relation not admitting an injective representation. There are four states s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 and the preference among them is indicated below:
Let the language be finite with at least 3 different valuations M , N and P . Let γ M , γ N and γ P be formulas each one with only one model, M , N and P respectively. Let l(
It is easy to verify that this model is cumulative. Let ⊲ be the explanatory relation associated to this model. Then ⊲ cannot be represented by an injective single valued cumulative l-model. In fact, let E = (T, m, ≪) be any single valued cumulative l-model such that
Then it is not difficult to show that there is s ∈ min( α, ≪) and t ∈ min( β, ≪) such that m(s) = m(t) and s = t.
In [22] it was shown several sufficient conditions for obtaining injective representations of E-Scumulative relations in terms of postulates like LOR, E-R-Cut and ROR (see [22] for the definition of these postulates). In this paper we obtain representation theorems for E-cumulative relations without assuming any of those postulates and, in the general case, the models we construct are not injective. However, we do not know a characterization (in terms of postulates) of explanatory relations representable by injective models. The analogous question for consequence relations turned out to be difficult (see [13, 21, 24, 25] ).
Consequence relations versus explanatory relations
As we said in the introduction, it is natural to wonder about the possibility of reducing the representation of an explanatory relation to that of its associate consequence relation |∼ ⊲ and viceversa. In this section we make some comments about this issue.
On the one hand, as we already showed in section 3.4, the map ⊲ → |∼ ⊲ is not injective and thus we cannot expect, in general, to get a model for ⊲ from a model for |∼ ⊲ . Even in the case when ⊲ is causal (i.e. when (Φ • Ψ)( ⊲ ) = ⊲) we do not know a direct way for transforming a KLM model of |∼ into a model of ⊲ |∼ . Even though the proof of theorem 6.8 is similar to the proof of the representation theorem for preferential consequence relations as given in [16] , our results do not seem to be a corollary of those in [16] .
On the other hand, we now show that our representation theorems for explanatory relations provide a way of representing preferential consequence relations in the KLM sense. However, our result seems weaker than the corresponding KLM theorem, since the model we get is only cumulative.
To each single valued cumulative model E = S, l, ≺ we associate a KLM model as follows: Let M = (S, i, ≺) where i(s) = mod(Σ ∪ {l(s)}) for each s ∈ S. Then M is a cumulative model in the KLM sense and clearly |∼ E is exactly the consequence relation associate to M. We recall that |∼ E was defined by:
α |∼ E θ def ⇔ ∀s ∈ min( α) (l(s) ⊢ Σ θ ).
Also notice that
|∼ E = |∼ ⊲ E .
Theorem 7.1. Let |∼ be a consequence relation adequate with respect to Σ. Then |∼ is preferential iff there is a single valued cumulative transitive model E = S, l, ≺ with property P such that |∼=|∼ E .
Proof. (i) Suppose |∼ is preferential. Then ⊲ |∼ is E-S-cumulative and satisfies RS. Therefore by theorem 6.8 there is a single valued cumulative transitive model E = S, l, ≺ with property P such that ⊲ |∼ = ⊲ E and from this it is easy to verify that |∼ = |∼ E (this is just the fact that ⊲ |∼ is a causal relation).
(ii) Let E = S, l, ≺ be a single valued cumulative transitive model with property P and |∼=|∼ E . By part (iii) of proposition 5.3 we have that ⊲ E satisfies RS and thus ⊲ E is preferential by lemma 2.7. By part (ii) of theorem 3.4, |∼ ⊲ E is preferential. Since |∼ E = |∼ ⊲ E then |∼ is preferential.
Final comments
We have presented several representation theorems which are summarized in the following These results reflect a duality between explanatory relations and consequence relations. The duality is given by the maps ⊲ → |∼ ⊲ and |∼ → ⊲ |∼ . These maps preserve the structural properties but do not provide a reduction between explanatory and consequence relations. In fact, there are different explanatory relations such that their corresponding abductive consequence relations are the same, thus when we move from ⊲ to |∼ ⊲ the actual explanations can be lost. On the other hand, we have derived from our results a representation theorem (in the sense of KLM) for preferential consequence relations. All these facts seem to indicate that the notion of an explanatory relation is more basic than the notion of a consequence relation.
We have introduced the new notion of a cumulative l-model where the smoothness condition depends on both the preference relation and the labeling function. We have shown that this more general notion is necessary for representing some E-cumulative explanatory relations. As one of the referees suggested, it is an open question whether the l-models can served to represent an interesting class of consequence relations (in [9] was analyzed a related problem.)
There is a natural question suggested by our results: are these representation theorems providing a semantic for explanatory reasoning (at least for the type studied in this paper)? For the most general case, our representation theorems are in terms of sets of formulas which cannot be assumed to be deductively closed. Hence those theorems cannot be, in general, presented in terms of valuations. This is not surprising, as we cannot expect to represent an arbitrary explanatory relation purely in terms of valuations because, in general, explanatory relations are not syntax independent as they might not satisfy RLE Σ . Nevertheless, our theorems provide a representation of an explanatory relation in terms of a preferential structure that uses sets of formulas instead of valuations.
Some of the postulates for explanatory reasoning are really properties about an inference process involving two relations: ⊲ and |∼. The first relation encodes how an agent explains an observation and the second one says what else the agent expects to hold in the particular situation under observation. For example, we can rewrite E-CM and E-C-Cut, respectively, as follows:
If α ⊲ γ and α |∼ β, then (α ∧ β) ⊲ γ If (α ∧ β) ⊲ γ and α |∼ β, then α ⊲ γ From this perspective, in order to make the connection between ⊲ and |∼ more tight, it would be convenient to add some extra axioms. For instance, we have already encountered in section 2.3 the following postulate: If α ⊲ γ, then γ |∼ α.
The advantages and scope of this approach based on two relations is an open problem. We want to recall another open question left in [20] . We have worked with properties related to a fixed background theory. However, in the more general situation, explanatory reasoning can be regarded as a process with three parameters: an observation, an explanation and a background theory [1, 7] . Thus it would be interesting to develop a theory that can deal with observations that may lead to a revision of the background theory.
